Реферат: Европейская денежная система
For the Eurosystem the challenge is to rise to a full central banking role as just defined. It is necessary because of the links that bind the various functions of money. The Eurosystem would find it hard to play effectively its most delicate role - the pursuit of a stable currency or, as the German Constitution puts it, "die Wдhrung zu sichern" - if it appeared as an inexplicable exception to the classic paradigm of a central bank. The public, the markets, the international institutions and fora would not understand.
But it is also difficult, because the steps to take are multiple and complex from both a conceptual and a practical point of view. Moreover, they cannot all be taken at once. Let me briefly explain.
In the articulation of any federal constitution (Bund, Land and local, to use the German terminology) the central bank undoubtedly belongs to the level of the "federation", or Bund. The fact that important activities are conducted by "local" components of the system (Landeszentralbanken, or Federal Reserve District Banks) is an organisational feature that does not impinge upon the constitutional position of the central bank. The same happens within Monetary Union. The Eurosystem is the central bank of the euro area, even though operations are carried out - to the extent possible and appropriate - through its component parts, the NCBs. Indeed, the constitutional and the organisational profile of the institution are not in contradiction.
Although a federal and decentralised central bank is not a novelty, the Eurosystem is a special case. It is the central bank of an economy that has a much deeper national segmentation than any other currency area. Its components have for many generations (and until few weeks ago) performed the full range of central banking functions under their own responsibility and in a national context. They have been accountable to, and sometimes dependent on, national institutions. Public opinion has perceived, and still perceives, them as national entities. The notion of the public interest they were referring to was the notion of a national interest. Significant differences existed, and partly remain, in their tasks, organisations, statutes and cultures.
In this situation, making the Eurosystem a central bank requires drawing the appropriate distinction between being national in the organisational sense and being euro area-wide in the definition of the public interest pursued. This is a difficult distinction to draw in conceptual terms, not only in practical terms or from the point of view of personal attitudes.
In the preparatory discussions and negotiations that led to the Maastricht Treaty, central banks took the view that monetary functions are indivisible and that, contrary to the fiscal field, subsidiarity cannot apply to the monetary field. Their traditional and strongly held position has been that the public interest assigned to central bank is a whole which cannot easily be decomposed. Indeed, while there is a fairly well developed theory of fiscal federalism, there is no equivalent for the monetary field.
As I said, I do think that the functions of a central bank constitute a whole that cannot be split. This does not exclude that the Eurosystem should avoid seeking more uniformity than necessary and that some diversity is a positive factor and has always been valued as an aspect of the richness of Europe. Perhaps even a limited degree of internal competition may be used as an incentive to good performance. But can the Eurosystem depart from the two historical models of the Federal Reserve System and the Bundesbank? What are, in conceptual terms, the criteria of what I just called the "appropriate distinction"? What should be the touchstone?
It would be an illusion, I think, to expect or pretend to have a full and satisfactory answer solely from legal interpretation. And it would be unfortunate if the Eurosystem were to fall into the trap of the narrowly legalistic approach that paralyses international organisations. The Eurosystem is not an international organisation, its model is not the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. Of course, the answer will have to comply with the Treaty, which provides useful guidance. However, the system is entrusted to decision-making bodies that are composed not of lawyers, but of central bankers. They carry the primary responsibility to manage the euro and are accountable for that responsibility. They have known for years what a central bank is and how vague the wordings of central bank statutes have historically been. Their touchstone can only be, in the end, the effectiveness in the accomplishment of the basic mission embodied in the triadic paradigm of central banking functions.
5. DEALING WITH EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT
The second challenge comes from the high level of unemployment in Europe.
Every economist, observer or policy-maker would probably agree that the most serious problem for the European economy, today and in the years to come, is high unemployment. In large parts of continental Europe the economic system just seems to have lost the ability to create new jobs.
Also on the nature and causes of European unemployment there is a large degree of agreement, as there was agreement on the nature and causes of European inflation well before price stability was finally restored in the 1990s. The key words describing such agreement are structural factors and flexibility. There is agreement that perverse incentives, direct and indirect taxation of labour, unsustainable pension schemes, overly tight employment rules and rigidities throughout the economy are the main obstacles to the creation of new jobs. There is agreement that the typically European welfare state system should be profoundly corrected, but not suppressed. Many also think that rather than following a "Thatcherian" policy of cracking down on the trade unions, it would be preferable to work with, rather than against, the labour organisations, although reform entails occasional confrontations.
As with inflation in the 1970s and 1980s, so unemployment in the 1990s - while being a European disease - is quite diversified across European countries and regions, due to differences in both policies and economic situations. It is over or around 20 per cent in the Mezzogiorno and Sachsen-Anhalt, but below 7 per cent in Lombardy and Baden-Wьrttemberg; over 18 per cent in Spain, but less than 4 in the Netherlands.
Notwithstanding the intergovernmental debates at a European level and the stated intention to undertake common initiatives, the instruments of employment policy remain in national hands, although only partly in the hands of governments. I regard this as appropriate because competition should not be suppressed from the labour market.
Adopting the appropriate policies of structural reform has proved extremely difficult in many key European countries, including my own and this one. Other countries, such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, have been more successful. Even the most successful experiences, however, have shown that reducing unemployment is a long and gradual process. Although some countries started labour market reforms in the early 1980s, they only reaped the benefits in the 1990s.
Unemployment will thus remain with us in the years to come and I am convinced that it should be regarded as the greatest policy challenge not only by governments and labour organisations, but by the Eurosystem as well. Let me explain why.
An economy in which unemployment drags above 10 per cent for years is a sick economy, just like one in which public finances or inflation are chronically destroying savings. To operate in a sick economy is always a risk for the central bank and for the successful fulfilment of its primary mission. In the case of prolonged unemployment, the risk arises both on a functional and an institutional ground.
On a functional ground, i.e. from the point of view of the relationship between economic variables that models usually consider, a chronically weak economy is one in which expectations deteriorate, investments stagnate, consumption declines. Structural unemployment may increase the risk of a deflationary spiral because a longer expected duration of unemployment may imply that households respond more conservatively (in terms of increasing savings) in the face of a deflationary shock. Today, we see no signs of deflation. Markets and observers who pay attention to communications by the Eurosystem know that the monetary policy strategy of the euro area is symmetrical, equally attentive to inflation and deflation. Thus, they know that if that risk became reality, the Eurosystem would have to act, and would act. But we know that monetary policy is much less effective in countering deflation than it is in countering inflation.
A more insidious threat, however, may arise on the institutional ground. It comes from a chain of causation involving social attitudes, economic theory and policy, actual economic developments and institutional arrangements. Attitudes of society respond to economic situations and policies, which in turn depend on the state of development of economics. Institutions, on their part, are influenced by attitudes of society. Both the course of economic thought and the practice of policy were lastingly altered by the Great Depression. The epitome of this historical event was the Keynesian revolution. In many countries the strong consensus about the primacy of price stability and the independence of the central bank was the outcome of the prolonged inflation suffered in the 1970s and 1980s. Here in Germany, it is rooted in the experience of hyperinflation. Would such a consensus survive if high unemployment remained a chronic feature of key European economies for many more years? And how would the position of the central bank change if that consensus faltered?
As central bankers primarily concerned with price stability, what can we do to cope with this challenge and to reduce the risks? My answer may seem disappointingly partial, as I do not think there is a miraculous medicine that monetary policy can provide. I would phrase it as follows.
Firstly, the central banker should be aware of the danger. He should know that in the future his principal objective may not receive, from the public, governments and parliaments the same strong support which has been the outcome of the two decades of high inflation. Since unemployment is what concerns the voters and the youngsters most, it may be increasingly necessary for him to play an educational role in explaining the benefits of a stable currency to those who have not directly experienced the costs of inflation. This is very much like the case of the post-war generations in Europe which, being fortunate enough not to experience the horror of World War II, need now to be reminded about the human costs of that terrible conflict.
Secondly, the central banker should avoid mistakes. It may seem obvious, but he should never forget that independence does not mean infallibility and that the likely new environment will offer no forgiveness for mistakes. A mistake would be the attempt to provide a substitute for the lack of structural policies by providing unnecessary monetary stimulus: it is not because the right medicine is neither supplied by the pharmacist nor demanded by the patient that the wrong medicine becomes effective. Another mistake would be to give the impression that the central bank has a ceiling in mind for growth, rather than for inflation. On the contrary, the central bank should make it clear that any rate of non-inflationary growth is welcomed and would be accommodated, the higher the better.
Technically, this will not be an easy task. The analytical uncertainty surrounding estimates of potential output and its growth rate might lead the central banker to respond quite cautiously to evidence of shifts in the rate of non-inflationary growth. While such caution is certainly optimal from an inflation stabilisation point of view, it might be wrongly interpreted as a systematic deflationary bias by the public and the politicians. This is a clear case in which any progress made by scholars in refining the analytical tools of the economic profession will greatly help the central banker to achieve his goals without imposing unnecessary costs on society at large.
On the whole, however, it is part of the central banker's role to make the day-by-day decisions that, in the end, constitute monetary policy. This responsibility can be neither transferred to, nor challenged by, policy makers responsible for other areas. Last week, the Eurosystem has made, for the first time in its life, an affirmative monetary policy decision by lowering its official rates. In this way, the Eurosystem has acted in line with its monetary policy strategy and made a significant contribution towards an economic environment in which the considerable growth potential of the euro area can be exploited in full. It is now the responsibility of other sectors of economic policy making to do their part by strictly adhering to the Stability and Growth Pact and implementing decisive structural reforms.
6. MANAGING FINANCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS
The third challenge consists in accompanying and surveying the rapid changes the European financial institutions and markets are undergoing, and will continue to undergo over the coming years, partly - but not exclusively - as a consequence of the euro.
It is sufficient to observe the US Federal Reserve System to understand the role the Eurosystem should play in the coming years: attention in monitoring changes in the financial system, active participation in the policy debate caused by such change, intense dialogue with both the Administration and Congress, influence exerted on opinions and decisions.
To a large extent the factors of change are technology determined, hence independent of the euro and even not specifically European. Technology is the driving force of the transformation in banking and finance that modifies the traditional deposit loan structure of banks. Technology also reshapes dramatically the back office and the communication with customers, thus producing massive over-branching and over-staffing in traditional banks. Also the globalisation of finance comes primarily from the combination of data processing and telecommunications.
Other changes are specifically European. Since universal banking has historically prevailed in continental Europe, the change from an institution-based to a market-based financial system is particularly significant in this part of the world. Similarly, the development of financial conglomerates is more pronounced in Europe than in the United States or Japan. Typical of continental Europe are also the labour market rigidities that make the restructuring of banks so difficult and slow.
Finally, there are changes induced by the euro. The removal of currency specificity as a cause of national segmentation of the financial industry is causing a convulsive shake-up of both institutions and markets. Since the beginning of this year, about ten banks ranking near the top of their respective national lists have concluded or started merger operations in France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway. In most European countries stock exchanges and other organised markets, which were legally and structurally organised as providers of a public service, have been transformed into profit-driven private institutions and are now in a process of rapid concentration. In the coming two or three years the number of banks will shrink, the largest banks will become much larger, few financial centres and market networks will replace the present one-country one-centre configuration.
In any national system the central bank would actively monitor and even guide the course of such a transformation. It would do so along with the various agencies responsible for financial supervision and competition policy, and with an involvement of the executive power itself. Although largely determined by business decisions, these developments indeed involve the public interest in various ways.
Surveying and accompanying a profound transformation of the financial industry would be a difficult task for any central bank. For the Eurosystem it will represent a daunting challenge because it will put to the test an unprecedented articulation of the policy functions that are called for. Let me briefly explain this assertion.
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