Реферат: Европейская денежная система
The institutional setting of the euro area establishes a double separation between central banking and other public functions. Firstly, a functional separation, whereby banking supervision is now assigned to institutions that - even when they are national central banks - no longer exert independent monetary policy functions. Of this separation we have many previous examples (Germany, Japan, Sweden, now the UK, etc.). Much newer is a second, geographical, separation, whereby - with only the partial exception of competition policy - the area of jurisdiction of central banking does not coincide with the area of jurisdiction of the other public functions involved (banking supervision, regulation of the securities market, etc.).
Experts, including academic people, have so far focused attention on lender-of-last-resort functions and suggested that the new setting would not be able to act effectively in a crisis. I have argued elsewhere why this criticism seems unjustified. Here, I would like to suggest that the real challenge could come, in my opinion, from tensions between the national and the euro area interest in the process of financial transformation.
The process of industry transformation will inevitably involve aspects that have traditionally been considered as sensitive by public authorities: suppression of jobs, location of facilities and headquarters. Financial transformation will also produce a hardening of competition and competition will be, to a considerable extent, one between national financial centers and industries, not only between individual banks or institutions. The propensity to defend national champions may prevail over the pursuit of efficiency. The risk for the Eurosystem to fall in the trap of an improper interplay between the EU and the national dimension of the public interest may become high. Like any central bank, the Eurosystem should be both active and neutral in the great transformation of "its" financial industry. The word "system" that is part of its own name refers, and should apply in practice, to the whole euro area.
7. COPING WITH A LACK OF POLITICAL UNION
The fourth challenge consists in coping with the lack of a political union. The relationship between monetary and political union and whether the latter should be a precondition for the former has been a central issue in the European debate well before the establishment of the Delors Committee in 1988. While I do think that there is a lack of political union and that this lack constitutes a serious challenge for the Eurosystem, I also think that the expression "lack of political union" is often used in an unclear way that blurs the issue. Let me thus first consider two meanings of this expression with which I do not concur.
First, I do not concur with the idea that there is no political union in Europe today. It is not because the content and the competence of the European Union are mainly economic, that its nature and historical role are not political. Even before the single currency, EU competence extended over virtually the whole Corpus Iuris of economic activity, from the establishment of "the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital" (the four freedoms proclaimed by Article 3 of the Treaty) to external economic relationships. To understand how very political these issues are, it should suffice to think about the place they take in the US political debate today, or have taken in the politics of our countries before the creation of the European Community. Moreover, the institutional architecture of the European Union is entirely that of a political system, not that of an international organisation based on intergovernmental co-operation: a legislative capacity that prevails over that of Member States, a judicial power, a directly elected Parliament.
Second, I do not concur with the idea that Monetary Union has developed outside the political process. Quite the contrary is true. The establishment of a single currency in the European Union has been achieved because of the strong political determination of elected governments over a full decade, from June 1988 to May 1998. It is significant that during that long period continuity has not been broken by repeated changes of political majority in virtually all countries except Germany. Technocrats, i.e. central bankers, have "only" played their role, crucial as it may be. They have provided expertise, from the drafting of the blueprint to the preparatory work for the actual start of the system. And, no less important, they have loyally accepted the limits of their role and recognised that the ultimate decisions have belonged to elected politicians. This is the meaning of the two statements of July 1988 and March 1998 with which the Bundesbank has defined its position at the beginning and the end of the crucial decade. "In der Beschrдnkung zeigt sich der Meister".
The establishment of a single currency is a strongly political event in its genesis and a profound social and cultural change in its nature. As economists and central bankers we pay limited attention to notes and coins because they are a minor and endogenous component of the money stock. For many politicians, however, Monetary Union meant little else than a common banknote. They saw, better than us, that for the people money has to do with the perception of the society to which they belong and, ultimately, with their culture. As such, money goes well beyond the economic sphere of human action. Indeed, the act whereby we accept to provide goods or services to an unknown person in exchange for pieces of paper that have no intrinsic value is perhaps the most significant and widespread testimony of the social contract that binds people. This is why coinage and money printing have always been a prerogative of the State.
Yet, for two main reasons it remains true that Europe has a lack of political union. First, the European Union is still not the ultimate provider of internal and external security, the two key functions that constitute the raison d'кtre of the modern State. Second, EU institutions still fail to comply with the key constitutional principles that constitute the heritage of western democracies: foundation of the legislative and executive functions on the popular vote, majority principle, equilibrium of powers.
Why does the lack of political union constitute a challenge for the Eurosystem? I would answer as follows.
In a period of less than thirty years money has abandoned both the anchors it has had since the earliest times: metal and the sovereign. It is true that central banks have struggled for years to free the printing press from the influence of the modern sovereign, as they struggled in the past to free it from the influence of private interests. It is equally true that the present status of the Eurosystem in the constellation of public powers is exceptionally favourable. However, only a superficial thinker could confuse independence with solitude and take the view that the lack of political union strengthens the position of the central bank and makes it freer to fulfil its mission.
The security on which a sound currency assesses its role cannot be provided exclusively by the central bank. It derives from a number of elements that only the State or, more broadly, a political union as previously defined, can provide. When we say that a currency is a "safe haven" we refer not only to the quality and credibility of its central bank, but to the solidity of the whole social, political and economic structure to which it belongs. And historical experience shows that when that structure appears to weaken, the currency weakens, irrespective of the actions of the central bank. A strong currency requires a strong economy and a strong polity, not only a competent central bank. The central bank is, and should remain, an institution with too limited a mission to replace the lack of a political union.
The problems posed by the coexistence of a single currency with a still unachieved political union will influence both practical and intellectual activity in the coming years. They will have implications for the central banker, the politician and, more generally, the citizen. For the politician the implication is that his political decision to move ahead with Monetary Union in advance of political union contains an implicit commitment to work for the completion of political union. The central banker should be aware of the special difficulties and responsibilities deriving from this anomalous condition. On the one hand he will have to cope with this situation and adapt his attitudes to a composite - EU and national - institutional architecture, one that lacks the simplicity he was used to and in which the Eurosystem now represents the most advanced supranational component. On the other he should be prepared for the further evolution of that same architecture. Finally, from the citizens that we all are, it will require a deeper reflection about the multiple "social contracts" he is part of, and the loyalties they entail.
8. CONCLUSION
I have been fortunate to operate in an environment in which no conflict has arisen between the central banking profession I have exercised for more than thirty years and the European conviction that, like many persons of my generation, I matured in my youth. Since the early '80s I have also been convinced that monetary union, i.e. a confluence of the two motives, was desirable and possible. At the same time, the challenges for the Eurosystem originate precisely from that confluence.
The challenges are not solely economic in their nature, nor can their features be captured by the functional relationships economists are most familiar with. Although partly related to economic factors, their features are in fact tied to the special institutional environment to which the Eurosystem now belongs. They derive from the tension between the completion of the union in the monetary field and the incompleteness of the overall construction. It is a tension because in that environment the notion of the public interest is no longer as simply and statically defined as it was when the Nation-State was an all-pervasive reality and the jurisdiction of the central bank coincided with its jurisdiction. Inevitably, this tension runs through the institutions of the European Union, the Eurosystem itself, and even our minds.
A challenge is a call to a difficult task; it entails the two notions of necessity and difficulty. The problems I have tried to describe are a challenge not only for practitioners, but also for the academic profession, because their solutions can hardly be found in a textbook and will only be invented if the creativity of practitioners will be supplemented with that of scholars.
***
Monetary policy in EMU
Prof. Otmar Issing
Member of the executive board of the European Central Bank
Washington, D.C.
6 October 1998
1. Introduction
On 1 January 1999, the curtain will rise on a world premiиre. For the first time in history, sovereign states will abandon their own currencies in favour of a common currency, and transfer their monetary policy sovereignty to a newly created supranational institution. This process is all the more unusual from a historical perspective because the national currencies involved are not being abolished because of their weakness. On the contrary, proof of a large measure of monetary stability is demanded as a precondition for participation.
The decision has been taken. The Euro will start on time. It must not - and it will not - fail. The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) will devote its best endeavours to making European Monetary Union (EMU) a success.
The French president recently called this unique project a "great collective adventure". As a central banker I am generally not in favour of "adventures" - but who would deny that there are risks and uncertainties in this enterprise? You should be reassured that at the European Central Bank (ECB), we have the necessary independence, instruments and tools to deal with these risks and uncertainties in a successful way. I will discuss some of these in a moment.
Moreover, when considering the uncertainties implied by the transition to Stage Three of EMU, we should not forget that Monetary Union will also reduce, or even eliminate, a number of risks. This has already been demonstrated, even before the actual introduction of the euro. Recent turmoil in international financial markets did not cause any significant disruption to exchange rates among currencies of the designated participants in Stage Three. This is a clear demonstration of the success of the EMU process.
Today, I will address the role of monetary policy in EMU.
First, I will make reference to the final goal of monetary policy - the maintenance of price stability.
Second, I will discuss some important issues relating to the design and implementation of the monetary policy strategy at the outset of Stage Three of Monetary Union; and
Finally, I will describe some features of the operational framework of the ESCB that have recently been finalised.
Let me begin by discussing the over-riding priority we attach to the maintenance of price stability.
2. The priority of price stability
The Treaty on European Union - the Maastricht Treaty - stipulates that the "primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability". It was left to the ESCB to provide a quantitative definition of this primary objective. At the ECB's precursor, the European Monetary Institute (EMI), it was agreed that, in the interests of transparency and accountability, the ESCB's chosen operational definition of price stability should be announced publicly. This announcement would form an important element of the overall monetary policy strategy. Simply defining price stability leaves open the question of why price stability is desirable. As a central banker, the benefits of price stability appear self-evident. Any single argument in favour of price stability cannot comprehensively describe the benefits that it brings.
For instance, concerning the United States, Martin Feldstein has recently shown that, in combination with taxes and social contributions, even quite modest rates of inflation can cause considerable real economic losses. Research at the Bundesbank has produced similar results for Germany.
But elimination of the losses caused by this channel is only one illustrative example among the many benefits of price stability. The greatest contribution that the ESCB can make to the euro area's output and employment performance is to achieve and maintain the stability of prices. Stable prices are at the core of the 'stability culture' we are trying to create in Europe, a culture that is the foundation of sustainable and strong growth in the standard of living for Europe's citizens.
At the same time, the ESCB does not operate in a vacuum. Monetary policy needs to be supported by an appropriate fiscal policy and necessary structural reforms implemented at the national level if this 'stability culture' is to be built on solid and sustainable foundations. The private sector also has its part to play, notably by exercising wage moderation, given the high levels of structural unemployment in the euro area. Progress on all these dimensions is not only desirable, but also absolutely necessary. Monetary policy alone cannot ensure strong, non-inflationary growth and improved employment prospects throughout the euro area. However, only a monetary policy focussed closely on the achievement of price stability can lay the basis for these conditions.
Of course, that is not to say that the ESCB can, or should, ignore broader macroeconomic considerations. For instance, the threats posed by deflation in combination with nominal rigidities to the real economy have to be taken into account. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, let me be very clear: my discussion of deflation has to be seen in the context of the formulation of an optimal definition of price stability for the ESCB that takes into account deflationary dangers. These dangers certainly cannot be ruled out and our definition of price stability should reflect them. However, simply recalling the current rate of inflation in the euro area - 1.2% - shows that deflation is not an immediate concern for policy-makers.
Страницы: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21
